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Thanks for the thoughtful writeup and the PoC — appreciate the effort. Two parts to this:
Full Deno runtime support — not right now. The security framing makes sense in the abstract, but CodeBurn's audience is Claude Code developers who are already running So: PR for the Thanks again for raising this. |
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Background
One concern I've heard from users — and felt myself — is hesitation around running a young, unfamiliar repository's code directly via
npxornpm install -g. Tools that read local files and make network requests are exactly the kind of thing security-conscious developers pause over.Deno addresses this directly. It runs TypeScript natively and requires explicit permission flags (
--allow-read,--allow-net, etc.) at invocation time, so users can see and control exactly what the tool is allowed to do. No implicit trust required.How much work is actually involved?
Less than you might think. The core change is adding
node:prefixes to Node.js built-in imports:Node.js has supported the
node:prefix since v16, so this change is fully backwards-compatible — the existing build pipeline is unaffected.On top of that, a
deno.jsonwith an import map for the npm dependencies (commander,chalk,ink,react) is enough to makedeno runwork.I put together a rough proof-of-concept: mokemoko@5b59373
What this would enable
With minimal permission flags, users could run codeburn with explicit, auditable control over what it can access:
Network access, write access, and subprocess execution become opt-in rather than implicit.
Question
Is this something worth pursuing? Happy to contribute a clean PR if there's appetite for it. Equally happy to hear if the added complexity isn't worth it for the target audience.
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