fix(ci): pin GitHub Actions to SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks#4840
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bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
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fix(ci): pin GitHub Actions to SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks#4840bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
bhabalan wants to merge 1 commit intowebex:nextfrom
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…acks Mutable version tags (e.g. @V3, @main) can be force-pushed to malicious commits, as demonstrated by CVE-2026-33634 (Trivy supply chain attack). Pin all action references to immutable commit SHAs with version comments.
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This pull request addresses
All GitHub Actions in CI workflows reference mutable version tags (e.g.
@v3,@main). If an upstream action is compromised and its tag force-pushed to a malicious commit, our CI pipelines would silently execute attacker-controlled code with access to repository secrets (NPM_TOKEN,WEBEX_CLIENT_SECRET,GITHUB_TOKEN, etc.).This is the exact attack vector exploited in CVE-2026-33634 (Trivy ecosystem supply chain compromise, March 2026), where 76 of 77 version tags in
aquasecurity/trivy-actionwere force-pushed to malicious commits containing an infostealer. Thewebex/pr-title-checker@mainreference was the highest-risk entry since it tracked a mutable branch head.by making the following changes
Pin all GitHub Actions references to immutable commit SHA hashes across all 4 workflow files. Original version tags are preserved as inline comments for readability.
actions/checkoutf43a0e5ff2bd294095638e18286ca9a3d1956744actions/setup-nodee33196f7422957bea03ed53f6fbb155025ffc7b8actions/cache6f8efc29b200d32929f49075959781ed54ec270cactions/github-scriptf28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673bwebex/pr-title-checkere914bff8ab5e6f1a6a270da6954cd6bfd1d7f1fbChange Type
The following scenarios were tested
uses:references in workflow YAML files resolve to valid commit SHAs via GitHub APIgrepfor@vand@mainpatterns returns zero matches)uses:reference format changed from tag to SHAThe GAI Coding Policy And Copyright Annotation Best Practices
I certified that
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